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Abstract 
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) put much emphasis on the 
employment and inequality, a noteworthy shift from the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and their focus on poverty eradication. To 
achieve ‘Sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth’, SDG Goal 8 
contains targets on productivity-enhancing policies, employment and decent 
work, and makes reference to three out of the four fundamental labour rights. 
While these are necessary ingredients for a sustained increase in living 
standards and important elements of heterodox accounts of development, they 
are not sufficient conditions to create equitable growth. Drawing on examples 
from Asia, the paper makes this argument by addressing three orthodox 
conjectures: that workers benefit from productivity growth through higher 
wages; that factor shares in national income are roughly constant; and that 
policy interventions such as minimum wages are bound to fail. The paper 
concludes with two policy implications: (1) Countries need to adopt fiscal, 
wage and social protection policies that reduce inequalities of outcome and 
achieve faster income growth for the poorest – elements which can be found 
in Goal 10. (2) Effective labour markets governance needs to include the right 
to freedom of association and collective bargaining, the only fundamental 
labour right not explicitly mentioned in the SDGs. 
Keywords 
SDGs, poverty, productivity, labour market institutions, income inequality, 
functional distribution of incomes. 
JEL Classification 
D31, D33, I30, J31, J83. 
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Poverty, employment and inequality in the SDGs: 
Heterodox discourse, orthodox policies?1 
1 Introduction 
Since the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were adopted in 2000, 
poverty has fallen, inequality has risen, and a global financial crisis has had a 
devastating effect on labour markets. Meanwhile, the global development 
discourse has undergone a significant shift – away from a single-minded focus 
on the role of growth for poverty reduction, and towards a more nuanced 
understanding that emphasizes the challenge that inequality presents to 
societies, and recognizes the central role of labour markets for distributional 
outcomes. This paper analyses how the narrative around employment, poverty 
and inequality has changed between the MDGs and their successor, the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In how far do the SDGs reflect the 
heterodox discourse, and do they signal a breach with orthodox policies? 
Launched with the ambition to build the “most inclusive development 
agenda the world has ever seen” (in the words of Ban Ki-moon; United 
Nations, 2014), one of the most visible innovations of the SDGs is the 
prominence they give to inequality, labour and employment. While the issue 
was entirely absent from the original version of the MDGs in 2000, references 
to decent work are plentiful in their successor. However, the main elements of 
Goal 8 are not as radical departure from the old employment Target 1b as it 
might first seem. Their underlying logic emphasizes that productivity growth, if 
combined with employment and labour rights, drives inclusive and sustainable 
economic development. This is an unproblematic preposition from an 
orthodox standpoint, but it need not hold when approached from a heterodox 
perspective. 
This paper will place the treatment of labour in the SDGs in the larger 
discourse around employment, inequality and poverty to assess how 
fundamental the shift from the MDGs is. Section 1 will lay the ground by 
sketching two conflicting narratives of growth and poverty, and how they 
conceptualize the role of labour markets in the fight against poverty. Section 2 
will then place the trajectory from the MDGs to the SDGs within these two 
narratives. Section 3 provides some empirical illustrations from emerging Asia 
1 This paper was prepared for a conference held in honour of Rolph van der Hoeven 
at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS) in September 2015. The author 
would like to acknowledge valuable comments received from Rolph van der Hoeven, 
Peter A.G. van Bergeijk, an anonymous peer reviewer, Thomas Rixen and participants 
at a seminar at the University of Bamberg. All errors remain the sole responsibility of 
the author. Work on this paper was supported by the Bamberg Graduate School of 
Social Sciences (BAGSS) with funds from the German Research Foundation (DFG) 
under the German Excellence Initiative (grant number GSC1024). A revised version 
of this paper will appear in the forthcoming volume on “Sustainable Development 
Goals and Income Inequality”, edited by Peter A. G. van Bergeijk and Rolph van der 
Hoeven (Cheltenham: E. Elgar). 
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– the ‘most likely case’ for the predictions of the orthodox frame to hold. 
Motivated by this, Section 4 argues that the SDGs will only be transformative 
in the presence of equity-enhancing labour market institutions and collective 
labour rights. Section 5 concludes.  
2   Two accounts of  poverty, productivity and growth 
Before going into an analysis of the SDGs, it is useful to consider how the two 
dominant narratives in the development discourse understand central concepts 
and infuse them with meaning – in other words, how they frame them. In an 
often cited definition, to frame means ‘to select some aspects of a perceived 
reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as 
to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation and/or treatment recommendation for the item described’ (Entman, 
1993: 52). Frames are ideal-typical, internally consistent accounts of reality  
(and not necessarily the positions held by any one individual); they can be used 
as a heuristic tool to differentiate between conflicting interpretations of the 
world around us.  
Frames have repercussions for reality because they define problems, 
diagnose causes, make moral judgements and suggest remedies (ibid.). How we 
conceptualize poverty and relate it to growth and economic development, how 
we link it to labour and inequality, can therefore shape our understanding of 
the causes of poverty, and hence policy recommendations. Faced with the 
same reality (in as far as one objective reality exists), different frames can lead 
to polar opposite interpretations and suggest conflicting solutions. The 
discourse around poverty, employment and inequality is a good example how 
orthodox and heterodox accounts of development differ in terms of problem 
analysis, causal interpretations and ultimately policy recommendations. Placing 
the MDGs and the SDGs – arguably the two single-most important pieces of 
text for the development discourse of the past two decades – within these two 
frames can therefore help us to understand how decisive the shift between 
them is.  
2.1 Economic orthodoxy and the magic of growth 
From the orthodox perspective, poverty is essentially a problem of insufficient 
income. The solution then is to raise incomes, which – to be sustainable – 
requires to increase production (which gives rise to incomes). This is why rich 
countries have escaped absolute poverty and poor countries have not. In other 
words, growth holds to key to poverty reduction. Accelerating development by 
removing obstacles that hinder the efficient use of resources and adopting 
other growth-enhancing policies is then the natural strategy to combat poverty. 
Labour and distributional issues are not central to this narrative since, if 
growth is allowed to take hold, the incomes of the poor rise just like those of 
everyone else (Dollar and Kraay, 2002). Labour markets are best treated with 
‘benign neglect’ so that, like in any other market, the invisible hand can balance 
supply and demand. In this world, labour is a normal good and wages are 
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simply the price of labour that reflects the marginal productivity of labour. If 
they did not, employers could reap extra profits by hiring more workers – and 
would do so until they drive up wages so that this source of arbitrage is closed.  
If workers become more productive over time, the same logic applies and 
employers bid up wages until they match productivity. At the micro-level, it 
follows that wages grow in line with productivity. By extension, average wages 
will grow in line with average productivity and the benefits of growth are 
widely shared. It follows that, at the macro-level, the share of wages in national 
output will stay constant: simply multiply average wages and average 
productivity by the number of workers, and the numerical identity is apparent. 
If labour shares nonetheless change over time, this reflects a change in the mix 
of factors of production (or, in fact, artefacts of national accounting)2. Falling 
labour shares are nothing alarming, but simply a consequence of greater 
capital-intensity of production. These two axioms – stability of labour shares 
and wage growth in line with productivity – are central to link growth to rising 
incomes and poverty alleviation.  
A third cornerstone of the orthodox narrative concerns the role of labour 
market institutions and their potentially adverse impact on allocative efficiency. 
If wages reflect the productivity of an individual worker, setting their level is a 
micro-economic problem best solved by the worker and her employer. Wage 
inequality reflects the relative scarcity of different skill levels; investment in 
education and training is the preferred response to contain pay differentials. 
Any state intervention that tries to force the invisible hand is likely to be self-
defeating. Minimum wages are a prime exhibit in this narrative: set them below 
the market-clearing level and they are redundant. Set them above the market-
clearing wage, and they price workers with the lowest productivity out of the 
market and hence hurt the poorest. Even where minimum wages are not 
enforced, they still cause harm by deterring law-abiding would-be employers 
from investments. Minimum wages are, in other words, portrayed as a classic 
case of the ‘big trade-off’ between equality and efficiency (Okun, 1975). 
Another set of perceived inefficiencies is introduced by trade unions and 
collective agreements. By setting working conditions above the level that 
would emerge from the market, they serve the interest of a narrow group of 
privileged insiders, at the expense of outsiders and society at large. Collective 
labour rights such as freedom of association, the right to collective bargaining 
and most notably the right to strike therefore sit uneasily within the orthodox 
frame. If at all, they derive their justification from external sources (such as 
human rights). Less problematic than rights that affect the relationship 
between labour and capital are the abolition of child labour and forced labour 
and an endorsement of non-discrimination principles (albeit this often comes 
with the reservation that well-meaning anti-discrimination legislation can have 
 
2 These give rise to changes in labour shares when, for instance, the share of wage 
workers in total employment changes. Note that the (unadjusted) labour share should 
rise as the share of wage workers in total employment grows over the course of 
development. 
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adverse side effects). In sum, the orthodox frame puts its emphasis on the self-
regulating principles of the market and remains lukewarm and partial in its 
endorsement of labour rights.  
2.2 Heterodox counter-narratives of inequality,  
institutions and rights 
The heterodox frame turns most of these conjectures on their head. Poverty is 
primarily seen a function of distributive processes, which explains why relative 
deprivation is found in rich and poor countries alike. Growth is a biased metric 
of social progress since it weights the income growth of the top deciles more 
heavily than growth at the bottom. If the goal is to fight poverty, growth is 
therefore not a sufficient condition: what matters more is the relative incidence 
of growth across different strata. To explain distributional outcomes, the 
heterodox account emphasizes the central role of labour markets. They are 
unlike other markets and characterized by persistent power asymmetries 
between workers and employers. Moreover, labour is not a normal good. Cut 
wages, and workers will increase (not decrease) their supply of labour, given 
that they have to feed a family. This gives rise to rents and multiple equilibria; 
the invisible hand remains, alas, invisible.  
While productivity gains are welcome, from a heterodox standpoint it is an 
open question how they are shared between workers and employers. 
Measuring productivity at the level of an individual worker is seen as elusive, 
given that labour and capital – and workers of different skill levels – are 
complements. Whether productivity gains feed into higher wages or boost 
profits is essentially determined by the relative power of the two sides. Hence, 
labour shares need not be stable: shift the power in favour of capital, and 
labour shares will fall; strengthen workers’ rights, and they will stabilize or rise 
(see also Krämer, 2010). From this perspective, vertical redistribution between 
labour and capital is a central problem. Rising labour costs need not cause 
unemployment, but they force firms to find productivity gains and allow the 
most efficient firms to grow at the expense of the laggards (the so-called 
‘cleansing effect’; see Mayneris et al., 2014).  
Heterodox interpretations of labour market institutions stress such 
dynamic efficiencies and distributional impacts, sometimes dubbed ‘equity 
efficiency’ (van der Hoeven and Saget, 2004; see also Freeman, 2008). 
Outcome equity and long-term growth are seen as macro-economic challenges 
that require institutional solutions to solve coordination problems. Proponents 
of this view give prominence to the equity-enhancing impact of trade unions 
and collective bargaining (see Hayter, 2015) and minimum wages (Belser and 
Rani, 2015). While these affect the primary distribution of incomes, the 
heterodox frame also stresses the redistributive function of institutions closely 
intertwined with labour markets, namely social insurance and social assistance 
mechanisms (see Behrendt and Woodall, 2015; Berg, 2015b). 
Labour rights play a prominent role in this frame. Discrimination, child 
labour and forced labour are seen not only seen as a violation of individual
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rights, but as having broader repercussions by undermining fair competition 
and the prospects of other workers. The right to organize, the right to bargain 
collectively and the right to strike become central for workers to counter the 
inherent power imbalances of labour markets.3 These collective labour rights 
help them to appropriate some of the gains from productivity growth, but also 
to safeguard other labour rights. Without these process rights, all other labour 
rights become hallow and vulnerable. Labour rights are therefore not only 
derived as human rights, but find an additional justification that is internal to 
labour markets.  
Though necessarily incomplete and sketchy, the description of these two 
frames – doubtlessly familiar to most readers – provides a good backdrop to 
analyse the how the MDGs and the SDGs conceptualize poverty, employment 
and inequality. How radical has the shift been? One way to assess this shift is 
to draw on the three central conjectures of the orthodox paradigm: that 
productivity gains translate into wage gains and benefit everyone; that hence 
labour shares are broadly stable (and if not, that they change for good reasons); 
and that even well-meaning interventions such as minimum wage legislation 
ultimately do more harm than good. All of these are disputed by the heterodox 
account, which – unlike the orthodox frame – also puts emphasis on collective 
labour rights. 
3   From the MDGs to the SDGs: Equity lost and found? 
3.1 The MDGs: Counting the poor 
One undisputable achievement of the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs) is that they focused minds on eradicating extreme poverty. Half a 
century after Harold Wilson (1953) had appealed to the ‘conscience of 
mankind’ to launch a ‘war on world poverty’, this battle had still not been won: 
At the eve of the new millennium, 1.75 billion people were living in adjacent 
poverty (defined as living on less than $1.25 per day at purchasing power 
parities).4 The Millennium Declaration brought this embarrassment back into 
public awareness, combining it with other goals such as achieving universal 
primary education, reducing child mortality and improving maternal health. 
Looking forward in a spirit of optimism, the General Assembly did not dwell 
on the most puzzling question of all: How was it possible that, despite 
unprecedented global prosperity, millions of people were still subsiding in 
poverty? 
3 An early account of the structural power asymmetry can be found in Smith (1796 
[1776]: I.8.12) who argued that employers, ‘upon all ordinary occasions, have the 
advantage in the dispute [on the level of wages], and force the other into a compliance 
with their terms’. 
4 Data refer to 1999. Based on World Bank, PovcalNet, available at 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?1. Note that Harold Wilson 
referred to over 1.5 billion people who lived in ‘conditions of acute hunger’, so the 
number had arguably gone up. 
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In many respects, Goal 1 to ‘Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger’ was 
the corner piece of the MDGs that dominated public and academic attention 
alike. While reminiscent of Harold Wilson’s writing in the 1950s, the basic 
conceptual framework behind the poverty goal had actually been developed 
much earlier: by Charles Booth (1902-03) and Seebohm Rowntree (1901) in 
their path-breaking work on poverty in London and York. Both used the 
poverty line and the poverty headcount ratio (the proportion of the population 
below that line) in the same way as done in MDG target 1A to ‘[h]alve, 
between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less than 
$1.25 a day’5. Described by Sen (1976: 219) as ‘obviously a very crude index’, 
the poverty headcount ratio became the defining metric to measure progress 
on the MDGs.6  
While specific on the objective, the Millennium Declaration remained 
silent on the causes of poverty, and vague in the analysis of the concrete 
actions needed to achieve its goals. The text includes a commitment to ‘create 
an environment – at the national and global levels alike – which is conducive to 
development and to the elimination of poverty’ and mentions good 
governance, resource mobilization, trade and debt (United Nations, 2000: para. 
12ff.). Neither income inequality nor the labour market received particular 
attention. Apart from a reference to youth employment, the Millennium 
Declaration neither mentions ‘employment’, ‘labour’ or ‘jobs’ (see United 
Nations, 2000).  
By divorcing the objective of poverty alleviation from the social processes 
that generate it, the text fell short of the standards set by Rowntree a century 
earlier. He had studied poverty in the context of an inquiry into the ‘social and 
economic condition of the wage-earning classes in York’ and concluded that a 
central cause of poverty was the ‘lowness of [the] wage’ (Rowntree, 1901: 12, 
120). This insight later led Rowntree (1918) to investigate ‘the human needs of 
labour’ and to demand that the additional wealth created by productivity gains 
should be devoted to ‘the payment of a living wage’. To this end, trade broads 
should set ‘minimum wages which would enable [workers] to marry, live in a 
decent house, and bring up a family of normal size’ (ibid.: 138). 
The omission of labour became so glaring that, at the 2005 World 
Summit, leaders pledged to support fair globalization and decent work in the 
further implementation of the MDGs.7 The new Target 1B to ‘Achieve full and 
5 Note that, in the original Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, the wording 
referred to “halve, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose 
income is less than one dollar a day” without specifying 1990 as the reference year, 
hence implicitly comparing it to levels prevailing in 2000 (UN, 2000: para. 19). 
6 The term rose from relative obscurity. A search for “poverty headcount” on Google 
Scholar (accessed on 19 July 2016) returns 28,180 hits for the period from 2000 to 
2014, almost a tenfold increase compared to the preceding fifteen years.  
7 A/RES/60/1, para. 47. The discourse on the role of labour in a fair globalization 
was shaped by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, set 
up by the ILO from 2002 to 2004. Its members were a number of imminent leaders 
and scholars, including Deepak Nayyar; Rolph van der Hoeven led its technical 
secretariat.  
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productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young 
people’ partly filled the gap in the original list of MDGs (United Nations, 
2008). Necessitated by the requirement that data be widely available, the 
indicators to monitor progress were largely proxies for the underlying 
concepts: labour productivity, the employment-to-population ratio, the 
proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total 
employment (so-called ‘vulnerable employment’) and working poverty.8 The 
rationale for including these elements is simple: increasing labour productivity 
and wage employment9 should lead to a reduction of working poverty  
(i.e. those who subside below the poverty threshold despite having a job).  
3.2 From poverty to inequality: Shifts in the discourse  
of the 2000s 
By stating poverty reduction as an objective but remaining vague on the 
specifics, the MDGs left space for both orthodox and heterodox 
interpretations. On the orthodox side, the idea that ‘growth is good for the 
poor’ was a central paradigm (Dollar and Kray, 2002). This rested on the 
finding that average incomes of the poorest quintile, across a large panel of 
countries, tend to rise in line with average incomes.10 This relationship was said 
to hold irrespective of ‘policies and institutions that explain growth rates of 
average incomes’ (ibid., 195). Accelerating growth through market-friendly 
reforms, it was argued, was the best poverty-reduction strategy. This narrative 
allowed institutions such as the World Bank to re-cast Washington Consensus 
policies under the banner of ‘pro-poor growth’.  
The strategy had some success. With a fine sense of irony, Martin 
Ravallion (2004), at the time one of the most free-thinking minds at the Bank, 
concluded that ‘[t]hese days it seems that almost everyone in the development 
community is talking about “pro-poor growth”’, and continued by asking what 
exactly pro-poor growth is. To some in the orthodox camp, the answer was 
simple: ‘Growth is pro-poor if the poverty measure of interest falls’ (Kraay, 
2006). Applied to the MDGs, this was setting a low bar: As long as growth led 
to an increase in average incomes, it is likely that some fraction of the gains, 
however small, reaches the poorest in society, bringing down the poverty 
headcount ratio.  
8 For a discussion on the utility and limitations of these indicators in the case of 
Africa, see Sparreboom and Albee (2012). 
9 Note that the MDGs do not directly mention wage employment, but aim to (a) 
increase the share of the working-age population in employment and (b) among those 
who are employed, reduce the share of those who are own-account workers or 
contributing family workers. The only practical way to achieve both targets is an 
expansion of wage employment (unless the usually very small share of employers in 
total employment grows significantly).  
10 This is, in part, a mathematical necessity: If incomes of the poorest quintile grew 
faster than the average over an infinite period of time, the poorest quintile would no 
longer be the poorest quintile (see Luebker et al., 2002). 
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This account avoided posing a question central to the heterodox narrative: 
How are the gains from development distributed? Academics and institutions11 
that stressed the distributional impacts of growth shaped the debate in two 
important ways: First, they produced a wealth of data that showed the 
importance of different distributional paths for poverty reduction, that growth 
has a lower impact on poverty at higher levels of inequality, and that rising 
inequality over the past decades had undermined much of the poverty-reducing 
potential of growth (see e.g. Shorrocks and van der Hoeven, 2004; Dagdeviren 
at al., 2002; Addison and Cornia, 2001). Second, the heterodox literature 
brought back into focus how institutions and policy choices shape the 
distribution of incomes. This leads the poverty debate into more controversial, 
more political questions – such as how trade liberalization, financial markets or 
the labour market institutions shape outcomes (see e.g. Ocampo and Jomo 
K.S., 2007).  
Unlike 15 years ago, inequality and increasingly labour are now topics of 
the mainstream development debate. A good illustration for this shift is the 
World Bank’s choice of themes for its World Development Report: Attacking 
Poverty (2000–01), Equity and Development (2006) and Jobs (2013). The change in 
emphasis – towards distributional outcomes and the mechanism that generate 
them – was an important backdrop to ‘post-2015’ development agenda.12 Jan 
Vandemoortele, one of the architects of the MDGs, was among those who 
argued most forcefully that inequality should become a centrepiece of the 
SDGs: ‘A focus on extreme poverty and hunger is obviously more convenient, 
but even if the post-2015 agenda were universal, neither poverty nor climate 
change should be the centre of attention, but inequality’ (Vandermoortele, 
2015).  
3.3 The SDGs: How radical a departure from orthodoxy? 
How far have the SDGs heeded these calls? For those with enough patience, 
reading through the 35 pages of the resolution adopted at the 2015 World 
Summit holds some pleasant surprises. World leaders ‘resolve, between now 
and 2030, to end poverty and hunger everywhere; to combat inequalities within 
and among countries’ (United Nations, 2015: para. 3) and that ‘[a]s we embark 
on this great collective journey, we pledge that no one will be left behind’ 
(ibid.: para. 4). They commit to ‘combating inequality within and among 
countries’ (ibid.: para. 13) and recognize that ‘[t]here are rising inequalities 
within and among countries. There are enormous disparities of opportunity, 
wealth and power’ (ibid.: para. 14).  
This might be unexciting by academic standards. For a UN resolution 
endorsed by world leaders, it is strong language. And there is more: World 
leaders go into what they omitted in 2000, labour markets. They talk about 
11 These included UNU-WIDER, the UN’s Department for Economic and Social 
Affairs, the ILO and a few researchers inside the Bank itself. 
12 See the background papers that Deepak Nayyar (2012), Jan Vandemoortele (2012) 
and Rolph van der Hoeven (2012) prepared for the UN System Task Team. 
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‘shared prosperity and decent work for all’ (ibid.: para. 3) and that they 
‘envisage a world in which every country enjoys sustained, inclusive and 
sustainable economic growth and decent work for all’ (ibid.: para. 9). The text 
continues to state that ‘[u]employment, particularly youth unemployment, is a 
major concern’ (ibid.: para. 14) and touches on social protection systems and 
technical and vocational training (ibid.: para. 24f.). 
So have inequality and labour – two central elements of the heterodox 
frame – moved to the centre of a new development consensus, or are the 
SDGs still firmly grounded in orthodox policy prescriptions? There is, of 
course, the easy criticism that an agenda that ranges from pastoralist and 
fisheries development to desertification and dust storms, and has targets on 
modern energy systems and waste generation, has in fact very little focus at all. 
With 17 sustainable development goals and 169 targets, the world might have 
gotten more than it had bargained for. But then, the world is complex. So it is 
worth asking what the SDGs have to say about inequality and labour markets. 
Is there anything new that goes beyond the wisdom of the MDGs? 
3.4 SDG 8: Productivity, employment and labour rights 
The promise of Goal 8 is to ‘Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all’. 
With 12 targets that run for almost a full page, it is one of the longer SDGs. 
However, it arguably boils down to a narrative that relies on three ideas: 
productivity, employment and labour rights.  
Productivity is the starting point of SDG 8 (and an element familiar from 
the MDG Indicator 1.4). However, there is much more detail on how to 
achieve this: The first four targets are concerned with increasing output, 
diversification to achieve higher productivity, and policies that support 
entrepreneurship, innovation and formalization of small enterprises. Added to 
the mix is resource efficiency to decouple economic growth from 
environmental degradation, and access to banking in target 8.10. Next are full 
and productive employment and decent work for all (in target 8.5), expanding 
slightly on the familiar language by making reference to persons with 
disabilities. Other elements concern youth employment (8.6), the reference to 
decent job creation in target 8.3 and job creation in tourism (8.9).  
The genuinely new element is the recognition of labour rights (target 8.8). 
Goal 8 makes explicit reference to three of the four fundamental principles and 
rights at work, namely the right to equal pay for work of equal value (target 
8.5), the eradication of forced labour and the abolition of child labour, in 
particular in its worst forms (both under target 8.7). It also makes a more 
general reference to ‘labour rights’, but a notable absence from the list of rights 
enumerated in Goal 8 is the right to freedom of association and the right to 
collective bargaining – and hence precisely those human rights that many  
13 
 
UN member States systematically violate.13 So we are left with a three-quarter 
set of the fundamental labour rights that side-steps those aspects that make 
them most threatening to authoritarian governments. 
The narrative of SDG 8 is therefore broadly familiar (see Figure 1).  
It recognizes that economic growth and higher productivity are a precondition 
for sustained welfare gains, and then turns to employment as a transmission 
mechanism through which growth reaches people. The main innovation is the 
(albeit incomplete) recognition of labour rights. Hence, Goal 8 uses many of 
the key concepts of the heterodox frame. However, it mainly reflects ‘agreed 
language’ of UN fora and ILO declarations14 and contains nothing that is 
directly offensive from an orthodox viewpoint. In fact, the underlying narrative 
of SDG 8 is broadly compatible with an orthodox account of productivity as 
the driver behind social progress. By contrast, the question that motivates 
heterodox inquiries – how and under what conditions productivity gains 
translate into higher incomes – is given less prominence in Goal 8. 
Figure 1 
Underlying narratives of MDG Target 1b and SDG Goal 8 
 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation of United Nations (2008 and 2015). 
 
13 See the proceedings by the ILO’s Committee on Freedom of Association (available 
online at http://www.ilo.org/public/libdoc/ilo/P/09661/) or the ITUC’s survey on 
the violation of trade union rights (available at http://survey.ituc-csi.org/?lang=en). 
14 See, for example, the ‘Global Jobs Pact’ as adopted by the International Labour 
Conference at its Ninety-eighth Session (Geneva, 19 June 2009).  
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3.5 SDG 10: Reducing inequality and the role of institutions 
More radical departures from the orthodox account come in SDG 10 ‘Reduce 
inequality within and among countries’. Target 10.1 aims to ‘achieve and 
sustain income growth of the bottom 40 per cent of the population at a rate 
higher than the national average’. While it omits a reference to the worsening 
of inequality due to ever-larger income shares at the very top of the 
distribution, it breaks with the idea that growth is pro-poor as long as it (even 
to the slightest degree) benefits the poor. Instead, it endorses a growth path 
that Chenery et al. (1974) had called ‘redistribution with growth’. Target 10.3 
goes beyond the conventional promise to ensure equal opportunity, and calls 
for a reduction in inequalities of outcome – a much more progressive stance.  
Rather than seeing these inequalities of outcomes as unavoidable, the text 
alludes to institutions that shape distributive outcomes and refers (albeit 
somewhat vaguely) to ‘legislation, policies and action in this regard’. Target 
10.4 singles out the role of fiscal, wage and social protection policies to 
‘progressively achieve greater equality’. These are, in fact, some of the main 
levers for domestic redistribution (see Luebker, 2015). And it does not end 
here. Target 10.5 goes into the need to ‘[i]mprove the regulation and 
monitoring of global financial markets and institutions and strengthen the 
implementation of such regulations’ (for a critical appraisal, see Rixen, 2013).  
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis, this might no longer raise any 
eye-browns, but was controversial a decade ago when some argued that 
uncontrolled financial liberalization has little direct benefits for developing 
countries but can have devastating outcomes for their labour markets (van der 
Hoeven and Luebker, 2007).  
3.6 The SDGs and labour: What is new? 
In sum, when judged by their content, the SDGs present a significant 
departure from the MDGs on two fronts: Firstly, they incorporate a labour 
market perspective – largely by elaborating on the themes of productivity and 
employment that entered the MDGs a decade ago, but adding the perspective 
of labour rights (though shying away from naming the rights to freedom of 
association and collective bargaining, not to mention the right to strike). 
Second, they reject the post-MDG discourse that equated poverty reduction 
with orthodox ‘growth policies’. Instead, they advocate a redistributive growth 
path and name policies to promote inequality of opportunity and outcomes. 
In what follows, this paper will argue that action on SDG 8 will only be 
transformative for development policies if the messages of SDG 10 are taken 
seriously – and that labour market institutions can play an important role to 
achieve a more equitable growth path. In other words, it wants to make the 
heterodox case that optimism implied by Figure 1 cannot be taken for granted: 
productivity growth, even when combined with full and decent employment 
and some labour rights, does not necessarily lead to equitable development. 
For this to happen, one needs to focus on institutions and policies that shape 
the distribution of growth (see Berg and Kucera, 2008). In other words, labour 
markets need governance and not ‘benign neglect’.  
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4  Productivity and wages: Lessons from emerging Asia 
Most empirical research on the role growth and labour markets in the 
development process is carried out (especially on the orthodox side) in the 
form of quantitative studies that ‘test’ relationships across a large panel of 
countries. By contrast, many heterodox researchers have invested into the in-
depth case studies and sought to derive concrete, practical knowledge from 
them. Rolph van der Hoeven has devoted particular attention to sub-Saharan 
Africa and argued that the key constraint holding back the continent is not the 
lack of free market (as the Berg report suggested), but the absence of 
functioning institutions – labour market institutions included (see Cornia et al., 
1992; van der Geest and van der Hoeven, 1999).  
This section is inspired by this tradition and turns to three cases from 
emerging countries in Asia to assess the three orthodox conjectures mentioned 
earlier: (1) that productivity growth leads to wage growth, (2) that labour shares 
are stable and (3) that, where minimum wages succeed in pushing up wages, 
they also destroy employment. The selection of cases heavily biased in favour 
of confirming orthodox views: they are Thailand and China, two countries that 
experienced substantial productivity growth and operated under conditions 
nearing full employment (a critical, if rarely met assumption of the orthodox 
model). The third is Cambodia, which more than doubled its minimum wage 
within a few years – a move that should have devastated its garment sector 
according to orthodox accounts. In other words, the sample contains only 
‘most likely’ cases that present favourable conditions for orthodox predictions 
to hold. Flyvbjerg (2006: 230) refers to them as ‘critical cases’ that permit 
logical deductions of the type ‘If this is not valid for this case, then it applies to 
no cases’. 
In the orthodox discourse, the emerging economies of Asia are frequently 
cited for their record in terms of growth and poverty reduction (and, in many 
countries, light-touch regulation). Moreover, East and South-East Asian 
economies are often portrayed as an example of equitable growth (Birdsall et 
al., 1995). In a context of rising global inequality and slowing growth, Asia’s 
economic transformation and its record in terms of poverty reduction has 
indeed been stellar – despite the set-back of the Asian Crisis in the late 1990s 
and the recent slow-down in China. In the 25 years to 2015, labour 
productivity doubled in South-East Asia, almost tripled in South Asia and, 
propelled by China, rose six-fold in East Asia (see ILO, 2015). At the same 
time, the continent almost single-handedly achieved the MDG 1 on poverty: 
the number of people in extreme poverty fell by an astonishing 1.2 billion in 
Asia (while the poverty headcount rose marginally in the other developing 
countries as a group; see World Bank, 2015: 35). 
But it is easy to forget that many parts of today’s Asia still resemble the 
conditions Rowntree found a century ago in Britain when he concluded that 
‘the wages paid for unskilled labour in York are insufficient to provide food, 
shelter, and clothing adequate to maintain a family of moderate size at a state 
of bare physical efficiency’ (Rowntree, 1901: 133). Replace ‘York’ with 
‘Kolkata’ or ‘Yangon’, and the statement will ring true for many workers today. 
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Just under 400 million people currently live in extreme poverty in Asia, even 
when measured by the old poverty line of PPP$ 1.25 per day (in 2005 prices). 
At second glance, Asia therefore holds more cautions lessons. These emerge 
when we ask how the gains from growth have been distributed, or, in other 
words, what would have been possible, given Asia’s economic performance. In 
addressing the three conjunctures of the orthodox narrative, the remainder of 
this section will expand on a theme that Rolph van der Hoeven (2015) put 
much emphasis on in his valedictory lecture: the functional distribution of 
incomes, or how much of the fruits of progress have reached workers in the 
form of wages.  
4.1 Conjecture 1: Productivity growth leads to wage growth 
There is ample evidence that countries with higher labour productivity have, 
on average, also higher wages. This is partly the result of a simple identity in 
national accounting: labour productivity is usually measured as an economy’s 
value added divided by the number of workers. Average wages can be 
calculated as an economy’s entire wage bill (which is a sub-set of value added 
in the distribution of income account), divided by the number of wage 
workers. It follows that, assuming a constant ratio of wages to total value 
added and a constant share of wage workers in total employment, average 
wages will be higher. Of course, in reality both ratios vary, but it is still a safe 
assumption that wages in Singapore must be higher than those in Cambodia – 
given that labour productivity in Singapore is roughly twenty times higher than 
in Cambodia.15 So raising productivity seems to be a good starting point for 
those who want higher wages. The problem, of course, is that a country’s GDP 
grows relatively slowly and a lot of variation can occur as a country progresses 
from a least-developed nation to (potentially) high-income status. Therefore, 
what broadly holds across countries need not hold over time, at least not in the 
short- or medium-term.  
To analyse trends over time in a meaningful way, researchers need access 
to data on trends in productivity and wages, and preferably on the capital 
intensity of production – data which are scarce in developing countries. 
Thailand is one of the few countries where comprehensive data on 
productivity, wages and other relevant indicators are available. As Figure 2 
shows, the country’s key manufacturing sector managed to achieve rapid 
productivity gains in the decade after the MDGs were adopted, with a 
compound annual growth rate of nearly five per cent. As a result, aggregate 
labour productivity grew by more than 50 per cent from 2001 to 2010 alone. 
Clearly, this is a highly impressive performance under MDG Indicator 1.4.16  
How did these gains trickle down in the form of wages? In short, none of 
the gains reached workers: real wages in Thailand’s manufacturing sector 
15 Based on ILO, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 9th edition. 
16 Note that the productivity growth refers to within-sector gains, i.e. they are not 
driven by the relatively ‘easy’ wins that can be reaped by shifting labour from low-
value added sectors such as subsistence agriculture to the modern sector. 
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stagnated throughout the entire decade, with nominal wage gains outstripping 
inflation in some years and falling behind in others. Data from Thailand’s 
national accounts confirm that this led to a large decline in the sector’s labour 
share from 47.7 per cent in 1995 to only 31.6 per cent in 2010 (see Figure 2, 
Panel B). Had the labour share indeed held stable since 1995, real wages would 
have been 50 per cent higher in 2010 than they actually were. 
Orthodox explanations for such a divergence usually invoke shifts towards 
greater capital intensity of production. Hence, the argument runs, it is only fair 
that the gains from productivity growth accrue to capital. Fortunately, one can 
put this explanation to a test. The capital-output ratio is the standard indicator 
for the capital intensity of production. It is derived by dividing the industry’s 
net capital stock by the value of total output (or GDP at factor cost) so that a 
rising ratio signals increasing capital intensity. Contrary to the textbook 
explanation, the data for Thailand’s manufacturing sector do not show any 
evidence for this. If anything, the capital-output ratio fell in the first decade of 
the new millennium (albeit arguably from high starting point in the aftermath 
of the East Asian crisis, given poor capital utilization at the time). The other 
striking statistic that can be derived from the national accounts is the net rate 
of return, or the operating surplus and mixed income that accrues to capital 
after adjusting for the consumption of fixed capital (hence, net and not gross). 
From an already impressive 16.7 per cent in 2000 it reaches an all-time high of 
26.2 per cent in 2010 (see Figure 2, Panel B). 
In sum, Thailand presents a striking case where, for an entire decade, all 
the benefits from an impressive productivity performance accrued to capital, 
and none reached workers. Why have the gains been distributed so unevenly? 
A key factor is the modest adjustment of minimum wage adjustments during 
this period, which largely tracked inflation. In the absence of strong trade 
unions and any meaningful collective bargaining over wages, employers used 
these as a benchmark for wage adjustments (see Boonyamanond et al., 2013). 
As a result, Thai workers (and the many migrants in the sector) were not able 
to capture any gains. Real wages only increased in 2012/13, when the 
government of Yingluck Shinawatra fulfilled a campaign pledge and raised the 
minimum wage to 300 Baht per day (approximately US$ 8).17  
The Thai example therefore presents a puzzle for the orthodox narrative, 
but the outcome is entirely plausible from the heterodox perspective. It 
supports the argument that, in the absence of strong wage-setting institutions, 
productivity gains by themselves are an insufficient condition for higher wages.  
 
17 The minimum wage has remained at this level, and prospects that it will be raised 
under the current military government (which has branded minimum wages as a 
‘populist policy’) are slim. On 16 November 2015, the National Wage Committee 
voted to freeze it at its current level. See Bangkok Post, Panel votes to freeze minimum wage 
through June (16 November 2015). 
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Figure 2 
Key statistics for Thailand’s manufacturing sector 
Panel A 
Labour productivity and average real wages, 
2001-2016 
Panel B 
Labour share, capital-output ratio and net rate of return, 
1995-2015 
  
* Data for 2016 are up to the third quarter. 
Note: Annual data are calculated as simple averages of 
quarterly data. Productivity data from the new series (2013 
= 100) are linked to the old series based on the ratio of the 
two series in 2013. Wages refer to government and private 
employees. 
 
p = provisional figures. 
Note: The labour share is measured as compensation  
of employees / value added; the net rate of return is 
measured as net operating surplus (incl. mixed income)  
/ net capital stock at current replacement cost; the 
capital-output ratio is measured as net capital stock over 
GDP at factor cost. Hence, a falling ratio represents 
declining capital intensity. 
Source: Bank of Thailand (Series EC_EI_029, 
EC_EI_029_S2, EC_RL_014, EC_RL_014_S2 and 
EC_EI_027). 
Source: Thailand National Economic and Social 
Development Board (NESDB): Capital Stock of Thailand 
2015 (Bangkok, n.d.) and NESDB: National Accounts of 
Thailand 2015 (Bangkok, n.d.). 
4.2 Conjecture 2: Labour shares are stable 
When productivity growth does not translate into higher real wages, this can – 
as in the case of Thailand – lead to large shifts in the functional distribution of 
incomes in favour of capital.18 As the discussion above has shown, Conjectures 
1 and 2 are merely two different ways to look at the same underlying principle 
– though traditionally economists have placed greater attention on the analysis 
of labour shares (which is less demanding in terms of data requirements). One 
prominent example is Kaldor’s (1961) ‘stylized fact’ of stable labour shares. 
Does this hold at least in the aggregate – or are instances of shifts in labour 
shares common? As the ILO’s Global Wage Report has documented over the 
years, shifts in the functional distribution to the disadvantage of labour have 
become more the rule than the exception since the 1990s (see ILO, 2012 and 
18 If real wages should grow in line with productivity, the labour share should remain 
roughly stable. There are, however, a few other, technical factors to explain minor 
changes in labour shares. These include a difference in the deflators used to deflate 
GDP (implicit GDP deflator) and wages (CPI); changes in employers’ social 
contributions (which are counted towards the labour share, but not towards wages); 
and most importantly changes in the share of wage workers in total employment. 
Note that Asia has witnessed a rapid increase in the share of wage employment, which 
should bias trends in the unadjusted labour share upwards. 
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2014). Major driving factors are globalization, the deregulation of labour 
markets and the ‘financialization’ of economies, or structural changes that 
increase the role of financial actors (Guscina, 2006; ILO, 2012: 50ff.).  
While the trend of falling labour shares is well-documented for many 
advanced economies, the available data show that developing countries have 
not been immune from the same forces. In a recent paper that adjusts national 
accounts data for changes in the employment structure, Trapp (2015) shows 
that declining labour shares are a near-universal phenomenon in most 
developing regions. However, East Asia and the Pacific stand out for the 
sharpest decline of 14 percentage points between 1990 and 2011. Hence, 
Thailand’s manufacturing sector is not an outlier for the region as a whole. 
Does this matter? After all, the performance of East Asia in particular has been 
stellar, given its record of poverty reduction. Again, the answer will depend on 
the perspective – and whether the focus is merely on poverty, or also on 
inequality. Capital incomes are, after all, highly concentrated and shifts in the 
functional distribution of incomes towards capital therefore tend to be dis-
equalizing (see also Atkinson, 2009). 
Figure 3 
Trends in China’s labour share, 1992-2014 
 
 
 
Note: Based on revised flow of funds account (physical transaction), as first  
published in the China Statistical Yearbook of 2010.  
Source: NBS, online data-base, SYB 2015 (Table 3-27) and SYB 2016 (Table 3-21). 
A case in point is China, where income inequality has risen dramatically in 
the past two decades. According to official data from the National Bureau of 
Statistics (NBS), the Gini coefficient for disposable incomes stood at 0.462 in 
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201519. This signifies an extremely uneven distribution of incomes, and is a 
sharp contrast to the more egalitarian distribution before the launch of the 
market-oriented reforms. China’s rising inequality coincides with a remarkable 
shift in the functional distribution of incomes. As recently as the late 1990s, the 
labour share had fluctuated in a relatively narrow band between 52 and 53 per 
cent of GDP. This period of relative stability was followed by one of rapid 
decline, with a low of 47 per cent recorded in 2011 (see Figure 3). However, 
this well-known decline in the aggregate labour share somewhat understates 
the fundamental shift that occurred in the Chinese economy since the turn of 
the millennium. 
A closer look at the data reveals that the labour share has been broadly 
stable or even growing modestly in the general government and household 
sectors (see Table 1). By contrast, the labour share in the corporate sector 
(both non-financial corporation and financial institutions) fell dramatically 
between 2000 and 2010, by some 9.0 percentage points in non-financial 
corporations and by 8.5 points in their financial counterparts. Given the vast 
size of China’s economy, the numbers involved are truly astonishing: If the 
labour share in the corporate sector had remained stable at its 2000 level, the 
annual wage bill would have been 2.3 trillion Yuan higher a decade later 
 
Table 1 
China’s labour share by institutional sector, 2000-2014 
Institutional sector      Change in  
percentage points 
2000 2005 2010 2013 2014 2000-10 2010-14 
Total economy 52.7 50.4 47.6 50.9 51.0 -5.2 +3.5 
Non-financial  
corporations 45.2 38.1 36.2 41.0 41.3 -9.0 +5.1 
Financial institutions 40.3 38.7 31.7 29.4 29.3 -8.5 -2.4 
General government 82.4 84.6 85.1 87.1 85.9 +2.7 +0.7 
Households 60.0 66.3 61.0 69.9 69.9 +1.1 +8.9 
 
Note: Based on revised flow of funds account (physical transaction), as first published in the China 
Statistical Yearbook of 2010.  
Source: NBS, online data-base, SYB 2015 (Table 3-27) and SYB 2016 (Table 3-21). 
 
(or US$ 350 billion).20 While the labour share has since risen, it is still short of 
its level at the beginning of the millennium, especially in the corporate sector. 
19 See NBS, ‘China’s Economy Realized a Moderate but Stable and Sound Growth in 
2015’, Press release (19 January 2016).  
20 Counterfactual refers to the year 2010. Technically, the data refer to total 
compensation of employees, i.e. including employers’ social contributions. 
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Of course, in contrast to the experience of Thailand’s manufacturing 
sector, wages in China have grown rapidly since the turn of the millennium 
(albeit from a very low starting point). However, few developing countries will 
manage to replicate China’s rapid pace of industrialization, structural 
transformation and productivity growth. So despite apparent success in raising 
living standards, the country’s experience also holds a more cautious lesson: 
that productivity growth alone does not guarantee workers a fair share in the 
fruits of progress.  
4.3 Conjecture 3: Where minimum wages succeed in 
pushing up wages, they also destroy employment 
Can policy interventions help to achieve better outcomes where the invisible 
hand of the market fails, or are such attempts self-defeating? Minimum wages 
are a particularly controversial policy tool and a core point of the orthodox-
heterodox disagreements – though there are some signs of rapprochement.  
In a paper commissioned by the World Bank, Betcherman (2014) reviews 
some 150 studies from developing countries and finds that the impact of 
minimum wages (and employment protection legislation) on employment is 
usually modest, and can go either way. By contrast, the distributional 
implications are much more pronounced: minimum wages generally have an 
equalizing effect among the covered population, but may fail to reach those 
who are not within their scope.21 The World Development Report 2013 used 
this research to argue that a ‘plateau’ exists where effects that enhance and 
undermine efficiency exist side by side, and most of the impact of labour 
market institutions is redistributive. The advice to policy makers was to avoid 
falling off the ‘cliffs’ at either extreme (i.e. too little or too much regulation) 
(see World Bank, 2012: 25ff.). 
While the theoretical debate is largely settled, it is still worth considering 
an illustrative example for the impact that minimum wages can have. As 
suggested by Flyvbjerg (2006), selecting a ‘critical’ case where the odds are 
highly stacked against finding a benign outcome is a useful strategy. What 
would the conditions be under which, from an orthodox perspective, 
minimum wages should be most damaging? Arguably, the following scenario 
comes close: Imagine a mature export industry that is subject to intense global 
competition and dominated by footloose investors and highly price-conscious 
buyers. Further assume that employers must comply with the minimum wage 
(which hence has ‘bite’), and that the workers do not consume any of the 
products they produce (and that there are hence no positive second-order 
effects on demand). Now introduce a massive shock, say a doubling of the 
minimum wage within the space of a few years. Surely, the industry would 
crumble and jobs would be lost? 
21 In Asia, one group of workers that is routinely excluded from the coverage of 
minimum wages are domestic workers. This is counter-intuitive, given that domestic 
workers are generally among the workers most vulnerable to unduly low wages (see 
ILO, 2013: Chapter 6). 
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We are of course talking about Cambodia’s garment and footwear sector, 
where the monthly minimum wage stood at US$ 61 until the end of April 2013 
and, after a series of adjustments and substantial pressure from trade unions, 
had reached US$ 128 in January 2015.22 According the Better Factories 
Cambodia (2015: 16), the industry’s compliance record remained stellar 
throughout this period.23 Hence, it is no surprise that average wages rose by 
almost half (with substantial gains even when adjusted for inflation) (see Figure 
4, Panel A).24 Perhaps more surprising is that employment continued to 
expand at break-neck speed and reached an all-time high of 643,000 workers in 
the fourth quarter of 2015, up by more than a third from 458,000 in the first 
quarter of 2013 (see Figure 4, Panel B). 
Figure 4 
Monthly minimum wages, average wages and employment in Cambodia’s garment 
and footwear sector, 2000-2015 (nominal US$ and number of workers) 
Panel A 
Monthly minimum wages and monthly average wages 
Panel B 
Monthly minimum wages and employment 
  
Note: Data on average wages and the number of workers are based on administrative records from the Ministry of 
Commerce and cover only factories that hold an export licence.  
Source: ILO (2016), based on Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training (minimum wages) and Ministry of Commerce 
(number of workers).  
 
A plausible (but unproven) hypothesis to explain this finding is that the 
increase in the minimum wage addressed a market imperfection, namely an 
employers’ cartel that artificially kept wages below their market-clearing level 
(see Gonzaga et al., 2013). The idea that employers collude to hold down 
22 The minimum wage further increased to US$ 140 from January 2016 onwards, and 
to US$ 153 from January 2017 onwards. All figures exclude bonuses and allowances. 
Disclosure: In 2014 and 2015, the author (in his capacity as ILO staff) provided advice 
to the Royal Government of Cambodia on the process and institutions for minimum 
wage setting, though not on the level of the minimum wage. 
23 Depending on the indicator used, between 97 and 98 per cent of factories were fully 
compliant with the minimum wage in the latest reporting period (making this one of 
the labour law requirements with the highest compliance rates).  
24 The exact figures are average wages of US$ 178 per month in the fourth quarter of 
2015, up from US$ 119 in the first quarter of 2013 (ILO, 2016). 
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wages is, of course, not new. Adam Smith had noted that ‘[m]asters are always 
and every where in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform, combination, not 
to raise the wages of labour above their actual rate’ (Smith, 1796 [1776]: 
I.8.13).25 The insight of the cartel hypothesis is that minimum wages provide a 
common wage rate for entry-level workers, and that employers tacitly agree to 
refrain from competing for workers by offering better conditions and wages – 
even when they face labour shortages. This allows employers to keep wages 
below the equilibrium wage where labour supply and demand would meet, 
generating large rents for factory owners. Lifting the minimum wage would 
increase the supply of labour, without significantly reducing effective demand – 
and hence bring the labour market closer to an equilibrium with higher 
employment and higher wages. Aside from this, it also redistributes rents from 
factory owners to workers (and hence shifts factor shares in favour of labour). 
Of course, none of this ‘proves’ that minimum wages cannot do any harm. But 
it does provide evidence that governments can use minimum wages to better 
the lot of workers, without any apparent employment losses – even when such 
an outcome seems highly unlikely from an orthodox perspective.  
5  The role of  institutions for inclusive growth 
The discussion of these cases does not refute perceived wisdom about the 
importance of productivity growth for a long-term increase in living standards, 
but it holds two cautious lessons for the link between economic growth and 
poverty eradication: Firstly, in the absence of strong labour market institutions, 
the orthodox conjecture that productivity growth translates into higher wages 
need not hold. In the absence of labour market institutions and strong trade 
unions that are an effective voice for workers, wages can fall behind 
productivity growth for extended periods of time, resulting in large shifts in the 
functional distribution of income (which cannot be explained away by 
increased capital intensity). This has adverse effects on inequality, widening the 
gap between those who have command over productive resources and those 
who rely on manual labour for their livelihoods.  
Secondly, wage setting mechanisms can help to strengthen or re-establish 
the link from productivity growth to higher wages. Contrary to orthodox 
claims, this need not have negative repercussions for employment – even in 
the case of relatively large minimum wage increases. Hence, there is hence a 
compelling case that well-designed labour market institutions can make a 
significant contribution to achieving greater equity – with only modest effects 
in terms of efficiency gains or losses (see Betcherman, 2014).  
25 Interestingly, Smith continued by stating that ‘[t]o violate this combination is every 
where a most unpopular action, and a fort of reproach to a master among his 
neighbours and equals’ (Smith, 1796 [1776]: I.8.13). 
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Figure 5 
Narrative for equitable growth based on SDG Goals 8 and 10 
 
 
Source: Author’s interpretation of United Nations (2015). 
 
For the SDGs, this implies that the underlying narrative of Goal 8 looks 
fragile. While the prominence it gives to productivity, employment and labour 
rights presents major progress on the MDGs, implementing these elements in 
isolation runs danger of falling short of the potential they hold for a departure 
from orthodox development policies. To make a lasting impact on inequality 
and contribute to just and inclusive societies, policy makers need to looking 
beyond Goal 8 and link labour to a more complex strategy for equitable 
growth (see Figure 5). Fortunately, the SDGs contain two crucial elements: 
Firstly, Goal 10 spells out a commitment to fiscal, wage and social 
protection policies that reduce inequalities of outcome and achieve faster 
income growth for the poorest (targets 10.1, 10.3 and 10.4). As argued above, 
building sound labour market institutions is one core element of such a policy 
set (Berg, 2015a). They range from wage setting mechanisms that contribute to 
a more equitable primary distribution of incomes to social security and tax 
policies. Although their objective is often not primarily redistributive, their 
aggregate impact can be a much more equitable secondary distribution of 
disposable incomes (Luebker, 2015).  
Secondly, workers need to have a voice in these institutions and need to 
be able to negotiate their share in the fruits of progress through direct 
participation in wage-setting mechanisms (be it minimum wage fixing or 
collective bargaining over wages). This requires freedom of association, the 
fundamental labour right that is not explicitly mentioned in SDG 8. While we 
cannot ignore its absence, one can argue that it is still implicitly meant: World 
leaders claim that the 2030 Agenda ‘is grounded in the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights’ (United Nations, 2015: para. 10) and later ‘reaffirm the 
importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ (ibid.: para. 19). 
For  workers, human  rights include the ‘right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
25 
 
and association’ (United Nations, 1948: Art. 20.1) and, even more explicitly, 
their ‘right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of [their] 
interests’ (ibid.: Art. 23.4). Of course, the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights has also established a right on decent wages: ‘Everyone who works has 
the right to just and favourable remuneration ensuring for himself and his 
family an existence worthy of human dignity, and supplemented, if necessary, 
by other means of social protection’ (ibid.: Art. 23.3). In a sense, the realization 
of this right is one of the ultimate objectives of labour market institutions. 
6   Conclusions: Heterodox discourse, orthodox policies? 
When the world belatedly noticed that employment and labour issues were 
entirely absent from the initial set of MDGs, the new target 1B was added to 
address this oversight. The underlying narrative was straight-forward and well 
within the orthodox frame of development thinking: growing labour 
productivity, if combined with an expansion of wage employment, should help 
to end working poverty. By contrast, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development makes ample reference to employment issues – the phrase 
‘decent work for all’ appears no fewer than five times. Goal 8 is devoted to 
‘Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and 
productive employment and decent work for all’ and expands on two familiar 
themes, productivity and employment, while adding labour rights as a new 
element. While the proliferation of goals and targets prompts cynics (and a few 
non-cynics) to dismiss the SDGs as an unattainable wish-list without focus, the 
more nuanced treatment of labour arguably presents progress.  
The problem with Goal 8 is that, if taken on its own, it is perfectly 
compatible with orthodox policy prescriptions. As was argued in this paper, 
they might not deliver on the promise of sustained, inclusive and sustainable 
economic growth. Its blind spot are labour market institutions. In their 
absence, productivity growth may not translate into higher wages for workers 
and hence the formula ‘productivity + employment = inclusive growth’ does 
not work its magic. Examples for this abound, including from Asia. The result 
of such a disconnect between wages and productivity is a shift in the functional 
distribution of income at the expense of labour, the very opposite of inclusive 
growth. To achieve a more equitable growth path, heterodox insights need to 
manifest themselves in policy. Goal 10 provides some useful advice on the role 
of fiscal, wage and social protection policies to reduce inequalities of outcome 
and to achieve faster income growth for the poorest. To give workers a voice 
and a meaningful stake in development, labour rights need to encompass the 
right to freedom of association – something that the 2030 Agenda only refers 
to indirectly, by invoking the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  
Of course, none of this is an entirely new insight. When Rowntree (1901) 
wrote his inquiry into the social conditions of the wage-earning classes of 
York, he could not help but to touch onto the ‘larger questions bearing upon 
the welfare of human society’ and recognized that the ‘legislation affecting the 
aggregation or the distribution of wealth’ was part of the wider social problem 
causing poverty (ibid.: 145). Changing the word ‘land’ into ‘world’, and 
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updating he statistics, one of his closing sentences still rings all too true today: 
“That in this land of abounding wealth, during a time of perhaps unexampled 
prosperity, probably more than one-fourth of the population are living in 
poverty, is a fact which may well cause great searchings of heart” (ibid.: 304). 
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